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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0O0 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
BILLY WAYNE BLACK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
0O0 
Supreme Court No. 14211 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of murder in the 
second degree and a sentence and commitment of from five years 
to life imprisonment at hard labor at the Utah State Prison* 
The case was tried before a jury with the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with the 
crime of murder in the second degree (R,21). Appellant entered 
a plea of not guilty (R.23) and the matter proceeded to trial 
by jury. Part way through the prosecution1s case, appellant 
twice moved for a mistrial after observing conversation and 
displays of familiarity between jurors and certain of the 
prosecuting officials«(T.74,107-109,145)• When the court 
. • • • - . • - i ~ • " 3 V 
denied the second of defendant's motions for a mistrial 
based on jury prejudice, defendant moved to dismiss the 
jury and asked to exercise his right to waive trial by jury 
and have all issues of fact determined by the trial judge 
(T.145-154). The trial judge took defendant's motion to 
waive trial by jury and the motion to dismiss for lack of 
evidence under advisement and ordered the trial to proceed 
(T.139,145-154), The jury returned a verdict of guilty of 
second degree murder (R.73). The appellant timely moved 
for a judgment of acquittal and/or for a new trial (R.93,95). 
After a hearing, the court denied the motions and sentenced 
appellant to serve a term of five years to life imprisonment 
at hard labor at the Utah State Prison,(R.96)• Appellant was 
forthwith committed to the prison to begin serving his 
sentence. Defendant/appellant now appeals from the verdict 
and judgment entered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and judg-
ment of the lower court and a dismissal of the action, or in 
the alternative, reversal and remand for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 19, 1972, at 2:30 a.m., two Orem City 
police officers observed an orange and black Chevrolet proceeding 
• - 2 - • ' • ' ; V , . . " : : ^ - . 
southbound on State Street towards Provo City "at a high 
rate of speed/1 They gave chase in separate vehicles and 
overtook the speeding auto after it stopped at the Emergency 
Room of the Utah Valley Hospital. The officers approached 
the driver, appellant Black, and were advised that he had 
an "emergency11 (T.60,79). A nude, bleeding female body was 
removed from the front seat of the Chevrolet by the police 
and hospital attendants (T.80). The body was warm and 
believed to be alive upon arrival at the hospital (T.61), 
however, the girl was pronounced dead upon inspection by a 
hospital doctor (T.80). Dr. Terry H. Rich, testifying at 
trial, stated the death "was secondary to a gunshot wound 
to the head" (T.49). 
The officers asked Mr. Black for identification 
and he provided them with a drivers license listing his name 
as Billy Robinson (Ex.1). He also delivered to them the 
deceasedfs drivers license (Ex.2) and the keys to the auto-
mobile (T.66,81). When asked what happened he told the 
officers he had come home and found his wife in that con-
dition (T.93). While the police were pursuing their investi 
gation, Mr. Black walked out of the hospital and disappeared 
(T.95). 
Decedentfs employer testified that the deceased 
3-" 
had left the bar where she was working in the company of 
Mr, Black at approximately 1:00 a.m., on the morning of her 
death (R.28). At 1:15 a.m., a tenant in room 96 of the 
"Alpine Villa Motel11 in Pleasant Grove stated that he was 
awakened by loud television and shouting coming from room 97, 
an adjoining room occupied by deceased (T.121). He testified 
that a man in a loud voice was berating a woman for "dancing" 
with another man. He stated there was considerable vulgarity, 
name calling, and sounds of "slapping.,f He stated a woman's 
voice kept pleading, "Please, Billy, don't hit me any more. 
Please stop." (T.122). 
The man was overheard to state, "I ought to kill 
you both" and, "I'm going to leave you to him," (T.122) 
and she was heard to reply, "Please don't go. I don't want 
you to go." (T.126). The man's voice demanded to know 
where the rest of the money was and he ordered her to pack 
his suitcase. 
After hearing the door to the apartment open and 
shut twice and patches of conversation, including, "take it 
off," "sit down," and, "turn around," the witness stated 
that all was "pretty quiet" and music was playing and that 
he "relaxed," thinking, "It was all over with." Later, he 
was awakened a second time by a "gunshot" followed by the 
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exclamation, ,fGod, honey, I didn't mean to do it!11 He 
stated he then heard, "a shuffling of footsteps and the 
door open, slam* Then I heard a car door open and slam, 
and the lights came on and the motor started. • . . I could 
see the car going down the road. . . . so I looked at my 
clock, and it was 2:30." (T.127). 
He stated that, "less than a minute" elapsed 
between the gunshot report and the departure of the auto-
mobile and that it occurred, "just about as fast as it could 
happen." (T.128). 
After observing these events, the witness returned 
to his bed and "listened for any movement" but did nothing 
to check out the nature of the circumstances related. He did 
not call the police or notify anyone and said nothing to 
anyone until contacted by the police several hours later 
(T.130). 
Mr. Black, testifying in his own behalf, described 
the events of the evening in question. He stated that he 
and the decedent had been drinking and that he had consumed 
fifteen bottles of beer at a cocktail lounge where she was 
working (T.158). He stated they argued on the way home 
over her activities at the cocktail lounge and that when 
they arrived at the apartment she took a shower. He stated 
-5-
that before she dressed they got into a second argument and 
he announced he was leaving* He stated that she told him 
not to go and slapped him and in retaliation he jerked her 
bra off (T.159)o He acknowledged that additional slapping 
took place and that each was involved (T.160). He stated 
he began packing his belongings and took some of his things 
to the automobile. He stated that when he picked up his 
twenty-two caliber pistol from the bed it accidentally dis-
charged (Tf161) and when he observed that she had been hit, 
he grabbed her, placed her in the car and took her to the 
hospital, driving at speeds f,in excess of 100 miles an 
hour.11 (T.162). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE TRIAL 
JUDGE FAILED TO EXAMINE THE JURORS TO DISCLOSE PREJUDICIAL 
FAMILIARITY WITH PROSECUTING WITNESSES AND DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN SUCH WAS DISCLOSED• 
Soon after the jury was impaneled and witnesses had 
begun testifying,the conduct of certain jurors began to raise 
questions as to their suitability as impartial fact finders* 
The court was alerted that a juror named Holman appeared to 
be more intent on observing Chief Michael Ferre than he was 
-6-
on listening to the testimony of witnesses (T.74). It was 
later learned that Holman had been acquainted with Chief 
Ferre for "30 to 35 years" and had lived for a time as 
"across-the-street neighbors" (T.224). 
Appellantfs motion for mistrial on the grounds 
that the undisclosed familiarity and friendship between the 
two prejudiced appellants rights to a fair and impartial 
jury trial, was denied (T\110). 
Shortly thereafter, a second juror named Laursen 
was observed in a private conversation with Brent Bullock, 
administrative assistant to the County Attorney and a chief 
prosecution witness. It was later disclosed that Mr. Laursen 
and Mr* Bullockfs father had worked together fifteen years 
and were close friends and that Mra Laursen was inquiring of 
Mr, Bullockfs father's health following an accident wherein 
the senior Mr, Bullock had fallen off a roof (T.222). A 
second motion for mistrial based upon the apparent prejudice 
of the jurors was made and denied (T„145), 
Counsel argued that the jurors were or should have 
been examined to determine the extent of their familiarity 
with the complaining witness, Chief Michael Ferre, and other 
police officers testifying on behalf of the State. Clearly, 
such information is necessary to determine challenges for 
!
'
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cause or for a rational exercise of preemptory challenges. 
The court concluded, "I think you waived it11 and 
furthermore, that there is nothing to show that ftan 
acquaintanceship or whatever with Mr. Ferre would be pre-
iudicial to this case" (T.107,108). 
Under Utah law, responsibility for properly examin-
ing prospective jurors rests exclusively with the trial court. 
77-28-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), As Amended, provides: 
"TRIAL JURY--Trial juries for criminal 
cases are formed in the same manner as 
trial juries in civil cases, except that 
the examination of the jurors shall be 
conducted by the judge» the judge may 
permit counsel for either side to examine 
the jurors, but such examination by counsel 
shall be limited by the court.n (Emphasis 
added). 
When defense counsel attempted to inquire as to the 
extent of the relationship between prospective jurors and law 
enforcement officers, the court cut counsel off stating, 
"I'll ask that question11 and then went on to say, ffHave any 
of you or your immediate families been engaged in law enforce-
ment work?11 (T.6). 
The judge carefully avoided any inquiry as to the 
f,acquaintencesff the jurors might have had among law enforce-
ment officers. The trial judge rebuked defense counsel saying 
"No, I donft think you said anything about acquaintences. I 
don't think we can go that far, anyway, as far as acquaint-
ences are concerned, I donft think we should go that far." 
(T.74). He further clarified his position later by stating, 
"Well, I think you could have asked me to ask that question. 
Ifm not sure how far Ifd have gone even if you had asked it, 
though." (T.108). 
In any event, defense counsel was deterred from 
exploring the matter more closely by the judge's hostility 
to the questions and his insistence on asking the questions 
himself. To get to the issue by a more circuitous route, 
defense counsel asked if any of the jurors "have a predispo-
sition to give more credence to a law enforcement officer's 
testimony.•.simply because...they are...law enforcement 
officers." 
Again, the court rephrased and redirected the question 
to the jurors and the following colloquy occurred: 
MR. ELLINGTON: Your Honor, I don't know that I 
would do that, but I think that I should mention that I am 
acquainted with Mr. Ferre and Mr. Blackhurst on the force. 
I see them here this morning. 
THE COURT: And they may be called as witnesses, 
isn't that right Mr. Wootton? 
MR* WOOTTON: Yes, sir. Well, no. I don't have 
-O-
either Mr. Blackhurst or Mr. Ferre lined up. Mr. Ferre on 
just one brief portion, your Honor. They were involved in 
the investigation, however (T.7). 
The prosecutor's reply was both inaccurate and 
misleading. It implied that Chief Ferre would not be called 
to testify. Furthermore, it failed to disclose that Chief 
Ferre was the complaining witness, (R.l) the Pleasant Grove 
police chief responsible for conducting the investigation 
into the death of the deceased (T.69), and the officer to be 
allowed to sit at counsel's table throughout the trial when 
other prospective witnesses were excluded (T.24,25)-• 
It is basic hornbook law that every person charged 
with crime has an absolute and fundamental right to a fair 
and impartial trial and the duty rests on the courts and the 
prosecuting attorney to see that this right is upheld and 
sustained. 
Under Utah law,it is submitted that the trial court 
has total responsibility for, and control over, the examinat-
ion of jurors and as such had a responsibility to require 
the State to fully disclose the identities of all witnesses 
which the State would rely upon to prosecute the charge. 
The court then had an obligation to examine the prospective 
jurors to determine the extent of their relationships and 
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acquaintance with each of the State1 s witnesses, particularly 
the complaining witness. 
When the State failed to disclose the complaining 
witness and/or misrepresented his involvement, as was done in 
this case, the court should grant a mistrial and select a new 
panel of jurors. It should be noted that this trial was less 
than two hours old when the irregularities were first called 
to the attention of the trial judge. 
I n
 U.S. v. Cavell, 287 F.2d 792 (1961), in reversing 
a state murder conviction, the court declared of a tainted 
juror: 
fVe rest our decision on the firm 
ground that Stephenson in declaring him-
self to be impartial and without prejudice, 
while not revealing that he was the son-
in-law of the County Detective who was one 
of the investigative officers in the very 
matter to be tried, who was to be a 
material witness at the trial, and whose 
testimony Stephenson would believe created 
an intolerable situation that resulted in 
fundamentally unfair trial to appellant.11 
It is submitted that the undisclosed familiarity 
between jurors Holman and Laursen and officers Bullock and 
Ferre also created an intolerable situation resulting in a 
fundamentally unfair trial for appellant. 
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POINT II, 
TIDE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST TO DISMISS THE IMPANELED JURY AND HAVE HIS CASE 
TRIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE SITTING WITHOUT JURY, 
After appellant's motion for mistrial based upon 
the lack of impartiality of the jurors was denied a second 
time, he then moved in open court to dismiss the jury and 
have all issues of fact heard by the trial judge (T.145). 
He stated that from the actions observed, f,I don't think 
that this particular jury would be fair to me.11 (T.147). 
The trial judge took the motion under advisement 
and did not formally rule upon it until the time set for 
sentencing when he entered a written denial of the motion, 
stating as the basis for its opinion: 
"•••that the defendant does not have a 
federal constitutional right to be tried 
by the court - as he does to be tried by 
a jury. That whether or not a jury may 
be waived and a defendant tried by the 
court is within the sound discretion of 
the court and that there was no abuse of 
discretion in this case, particularly in 
view of the fact that the first attempt 
at a jury waiver and trial by the court 
came after the State had presented its 
evidence.,f 
(R.97). 
Appellant's right to waive trial by jury is estab-
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lished by Utah statutory law not federal constitutional law. 
11-21-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) As Amended, outlines 
appellantfs right to waive trial by jury, stating: 
"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, 
but in all cases except where a sentence 
of death may be imposed trial by jury may 
be waived by the defendant. Such waiver 
shall be made in open court and entered 
in the minutes/1 (Emphasis added). 
The right of waiver provided by the Utah Legislature 
is unqualified and leaves nothing to the "discretion11 of the 
trial judge. The issue as to whether or not the trial judge 
has discretion to deny appellantfs right to waive trial by 
jury appears to be of first impression with this court. 
In other jurisdictions, however, the law appears 
to be clear. Where the State has acted to grant the defendant 
an unconditional right to waive trial by jury as the Utah 
Legislature has done, the prevailing authority is that neither 
the court nor the prosecutor can deny this waiver. The logic 
is well summarized in 25 Mich.L.Rep. (p.736) where it is 
stated : 
"If trial by jury, as we have been 
contending, is a protection for the 
benefit of the individual, then it is 
hardly consistent to require also the 
consent of the court, or the prosecuting 
attorney, or both, as a condition 
precedent to a trial without jury. The 
act of the Legislature is itself consent 
by the State; and there is a curious 
contrariety in calling jury trial a 
privilege and then making its surrender 
subject to the control of the court.11 
Where the State has acted to grant a right to 
waive trial by jury as has the state of Utah, state courts 
have uniformaly respected that right. In Grady v. State, 
(1931) Tex. Crim. Rep., 35 S,W.2d, 158, a defendant sought to 
waive the jury but the District Attorney demanded trial by 
jury and such was had with a verdict of guilty. In reversing 
on appeal, the court stated: 
'"The matter is not an open question. 
The Constitution recognizes the right of 
one accused of a misdemeanor to waive a 
jury, and the statute. . . emphasizes 
this right. It has frequently been ex-
pressed and held that the right was one 
the exercise of which it was not within 
the power of the court to deny." 
I n
 State v. Smith, (1931)121 Ohio St., 237, 147 
N*E. 758, the court held that upon arraignment and plea of 
an accused the statutory provisions giving him the right to 
waive a jury and to elect to be tried by the court are manda-
tory, and that the court has no power to reject the accused's 
waiver and order the case to be tried by a jury unless it 
comes to the notice of the court the accused is not sane. 
The court observed: 
fVere there no statutory provision con-
ferring the right upon the defendant to 
waive a jury and be tried by the court, a 
-1£-
different situation would be presented. 
But where the state law confers the right 
as it has here, it cannot be successfully 
claimed that the prosecution or the court 
may ignore the law.11 
See also People v. Martin,(1931) 256 Mich. 33, 
239 NoWo 341 and People v. Steele, (1882) 94 Mich. 437, 54 
N,W0 171, where the court held that the accused has a choice 
of two modes of trial and that such is a "substantial right 
of which the court could not deprive him0n 
It is not possible or practical for this writer to 
list the multitude of constitutional and statutory provisions 
in other jurisdictions affecting the right of an accused to 
waive a trial by jury. It is enough to note that many juris-
dictions have not granted an unqualified right of waiver as 
has the state of Utah. Federal law requires the consent of 
the government's counsel and the sanction of the court• Patton 
v. United States, 281 US 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 
(1930)o The state of Arizona, without benefit of legislative 
directive, has chosen to follow the federal rule. See Arizona 
v. Durham, 111 Ariz. 19, 523 P,2d 47 (1974). The New Mexico 
Supreme Court confronted by a constitutional provision 
establishing the right to trial by jury and in absence of any 
statute authorizitg waiver of said right has ruled that a 
defendant cannot waive his "rightff to trial by jury in a felony 
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case without leave of the court where the state declines to 
consent and formally objects thereto. See State Ex. Rel. 
Gutierrez v. First Judicial Dist, Court Within and For 
McKinley County, 191 P.2d 334, 52 N.M.. 28. 
The State should not be heard to argue that somehow 
this defendant is estopped to assert his right to waive trial 
by jury by failing to do so until the jury had been impaneled 
and the State had presented its evidence. There is certainly 
precedence to rebut such an argument. The Oregon Supreme 
Court found proper a waiver of jury in a first degree murder 
trial wherein the jury was waived by the defendant contrary 
to advice of court and counsel after the State had rested 
following four days of presenting evidence. The appellant 
court concluded that the defendant's reasons for waiver were 
"entirely rational.n His reasons of record were, (1) he had 
noted a juror glaring at him, (2) he did not trust the jury, 
and (3) he believed the judge would be "broader minded than 
regular people.fl Oregon v. Swint, 475 P.2d 434 (1970). 
I n
 Baader v. State, (1917) 201 Ala. 76, 76 So. 370v 
the court succinctly summarized the same issues now before 
this court and concluded: 
"Any other construction of the act 
would put it in the power of the state's 
counsel to deny, or render nugatory, the 
defendant's right of waiver of a trial 
-16-
by jury under the constitution and the 
statutes having application,, That such 
was the legislative intent is refuted by 
the history of the waiver by defendants of 
such constitutional rights as averted 
to. . . The substitution of a jury trial 
by the judge of the court at the instance 
of the state in the case at bar was an 
unauthorized exercise of supposed judicial 
discretion; it finding no support in the 
constitution or in statutes*11 (Emphasis 
added). 
Appellant respectfully submits that under Utah law 
the trial court's denial of appellant1s request to waive trial 
by jury was also "an unauthorized exercise of supposed judicial 
discretion.11 Appellant cannot be criticized for his timing in 
submitting his request to waive this jury. He was alert and 
observing and called the court's attention immediately to the 
problems of this jury with motions for mistrial. When these 
motions were denied, he moved promptly to rid himself of 
the tainted jury by the only means left available to him. 
The motion to waive the jury was made at the close of the 
State's evidence but before commencement of defense's case. 
It should be noted that nowhere in this record 
was appellant ever advised that there were any deadlines 
after which a waiver of jury was subject to the "discretion" 
of the trial court. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTfS 
MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AS THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE„ 
To establish the crime of murder in the second 
degree the State must prove that a killing was "unlawful," 
"intentional,11 and with "malice aforethought," and the 
State has a burden to prove each of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Instruction 15). 
There were no witnesses to the shooting and the 
State relied upon circumstantial evidence in its effort to 
prove the elements of the alleged crime. The State1s evidence 
consisted of testimony by a barmaid that Mr. Black was with 
the deceased an hour and one-half prior to her death (T.28) 
and the testimony of a witness described by the prosecutor as 
"an old alcoholic" who lrhas a difficult time remembering" 
(T.73), that he overheard an argument, threats and what could 
be described as a beating of the deceased in her room sometime 
prior to her death (T.124-132). The Statefs evidence estab-
lished that the cause of death was a gunshot wound, not a 
beating (T.49). 
The State produced no evidence as to what occurred 
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immediately prior to the shooting. The State's witnesses 
testified that he had "relaxed" and was "partly asleep when 
the gun went off,11 and that the next thing he heard was an 
exclamation, "God, honey, I didn't mean to do it!"fand 
immediately thereafter, he heard what'bounded like a shuffling 
of feet, and then the door opened, then shut, then a car door 
opened and shut, and the lights came on, and the car started,M 
(T.127). He went on to testify that the exclamation and the 
departure all occurred within a 1,matter of seconds" and 
"about as fast as it could happen" after the gun had dis-
charged (T.128). 
It is possible that defendant waited until tempers 
had cooled and then picked up the gun and intentionally shot 
the deceased in the head. To conclude that such in fact 
happened requires the rankest form of speculation. One must 
totally ignore Mr. Black's testimony that the gun discharged 
accidentally and his actions thereafter which support his 
claim of an accident and no other conclusion. His exclamat-
ion, "My God, honey, I didn't mean to do it!", and his wild 
dash at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour from Pleasant 
Grove through Orem to the Emergency Room of the Utah Valley 
Hospital in Provo rebut all inference of any intent to kill. 
From this evidence, there can be no doubt that the 
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jury did in fact speculate and ignored jury instruction 
number nine advising them in part as follows: 
,fIf the evidence in this case is 
susceptible of two constructions or 
interpretations, each of which appears 
to you to be reasonable, and one of 
which points to the guilt of the defen-
dant, and the other to his innocence, 
it is your duty, under the law, to adopt 
the interpretation which will admit to 
the defendant^ innocence, and reject 
that which points to his guilt.11 (R.61). 
There can be no doubt that the evidence before the 
court was susceptible to an interpretation that the shooting 
was accidental. The prosecutor acknowledged in open court, 
f,I donft think there's any question about the fact that there 
is evidence by which the jury could reasonably conclude an 
accident or murder.11 (T.136). 
This jury had been properly instructed that: 
"The killing of a human being was excus-
able and not unlawful when committed by an 
accident and misfortune in doing any lawful 
act by lawful means. . . .,f (Instruction 13, 
R.57)o 
The jury was further instructed: 
"...that to warrant a conviction on 
circumstantial evidence, each fact 
necessary to establish the guilt of the 
accused must be proved by competent 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and 
the facts and circumstances proven 
should not only be consistent with the 
guilt of the accused but must be incon-
sistent with any other reasonable 
hypothesis. . . ." (Instruction 24,R.46). 
To allow the jury verdict of guilty to stand 
constitutes a judicial acceptance and ratification of this 
jury's refusal to follow the court's instructions* Such 
renders useless this jury as a fact-finding body, and 
deprives this appellant of his rights to a fair trial. 
In light of the evidence presented by the State, this case 
should never have been allowed to go to the jury. Appellant 
was entitled to a dismissal of the Second Degree Murder 
charge as a matter of law. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL FOR THE PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY TO ARGUE MATTERS NOT IN EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PREJUDICING THE JURY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT* 
During the trial, the prosecution produced a rag, 
which a police officer characterized as a "skirt.11 It was 
offered into evidence with no other identification than the 
statement that it was found in a paper bag with a "bra."' 
Appellant had testified he had ripped the bra off the deceased 
when she slapped him. 
In his argument to the jury, the County Attorney 
made an emotional appeal for deceased, stating: 
ffItfs difficult for me to present a 
picture to you of Barbara Owens as a 
human being. But I want you to under-
stand that she's something besides 
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simply a piece of meat that's now been 
buried. I concede I havenft got much 
left of her. Ifve got a torn dress, 
Ifve got a torn bra, I've got a picture 
of her, and I've got her drivers license. 
And that's all. . . . (T.189). (Emphasis 
added). 
.'. • . He was mad. He had been drinking. 
He was jealous. He had beat her for al-
most an hour, apparently very violently. 
If you'll examine, much more violently 
than he says. All you've got to do is 
look at the marks and look at the torn 
dress, which he didn't mention, incidentally. 
According to him, she took it off her-
self." (T.193). (Emphasis added). 
At this point, defense counsel objected but the 
damage had been done and the trial court took no action to 
set the record straight (T.193). 
This argument by the prosecuting attorney was totally 
improper. There was no testimony from any witness that the 
rag was ever deceased's "skirt" or that it had ever been worn 
by her as any form of clothing, much less a "dress." 
Clearly, the prosecutor was arguing that which was 
not in evidence and his arguments were in no way a good-faith 
interpretation of the evidence. Appellant had testified: 
"During the time that we went home, 
we was arguing, and we argued after we 
got there. She went in and took a 
shower. She come out of the shower, 
and she put her bra and stuff back on. 
And we got into another argument over 
I told her I was leaving, and she told 
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me not to. Then she slapped me, and I 
jerked her bra off.11 (T.159). 
The prosecutor knew or should have known that 
there was no evidence identifying this rag as a "dress" 
much less decedent's dress. His argument to the jury identify-
ing it as such coupled with the clear inference that 
appellant lied by not stating he tore it off her and by 
saying that she took it off itself was clearly calculated 
to prejudice defendant by further characterizing him as a 
liar and a brute. 
It is improper for the prosecutor to go outside 
the record and make argument for the sole purpose of appeal-
ing to the passion and prejudice of the jurors. Sykes v. 
State, 238 P.2d 384, 95 Okl. Cr. 14. It is natural and 
necessary that the counsel for the State should have the mind 
of an advocate but the County Attorney, as representative of 
the people, is bound to refrain from making inflamatory state-
ments and is bound by a somewhat higher duty of fairness than 
is the ordinary practitioner in a court of law. People v. 
Vienne, 297 P.2d 1027, 142 C.A.2d 172. 
The trial Court erred by admitting the rag into 
evidence without proper identification or foundation and 
over the objection of defense counsel as to its relevancy 
(T.186). The prosecutorfs use of this seemingly innocuous 
bit of evidence made its admission prejudicial and grounds 
for reversal• Its admission and use as specified deprived 
this defendant of a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The individual and cumulative effect of the fore-
going assigned errors is clearly and uncontrovertedly prejudi-
cial and reversible error. 
Appellant therefore prays that the conviction and 
judgment against appellant be reversed and appellant be dis-
charged, or in the alternative, that the case be reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MARSH, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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